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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*USSR-Germany: In response to the communiqué issued by the President and Chancellor Adenauer, Moscow published on 20 April an authoritative "Observer" article in Izvestia which stresses the urgency of a German peace settlement and a "special definition" of Berlin's status. The article makes no proposals for new negotiations, contains no hints of immediate unilateral Soviet action, and is probably intended to take advantage of current tensions over Laos and Cuba to issue a pointed reminder to the West that the USSR still considers Berlin and Germany to be priority issues. Izvestia warns against "further stalling" on these issues and declares that the USSR "cannot wait any longer, since all deadlines have passed." No new time limit for a settlement is mentioned, however. The article also repeats the line of the Soviet memorandum to Bonn of mid-February and urges Bonn to take the initiative in order "to have its weighty say" on a peace treaty. The standard warning that the USSR will sign a separate peace treaty unless one is concluded with both Germanies is also repeated. 25X1

Communist China: Communist China is expected to conclude shortly a purchase agreement for some 6,000,000 tons of Canadian wheat to be delivered over a three-year period, apparently beginning in June. While final negotiations are still under way in Peiping, as currently envisaged the agreement would allow the Chinese to pay 25 percent down with the remaining 75 percent to be paid within six months after each shipment. According to the Canadian trade commissioner in Hong Kong, the Chinese at first tried to drive a hard bargain but have now "baldly stated" their need for grain. China already has purchased about 3,000,000 tons of grain from nonbloc sources for 1961 delivery, and another large-scale transaction is pending with Australia--perhaps also on credit. The credit terms--unprecedented in Chinese trade with the West--will help ease the impact on Peiping's balance of payments, but not sufficiently to prevent cutbacks in industrial imports. 25X1


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DAILY BRIEF

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
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Kenya: [The political deadlock in Kenya appears to have been broken by the Kenya African Democratic Union's (KADU) decision to participate in the formation of a government--the first under a new constitution providing for an African majority in parliament. KADU, the smaller of the two African parties, probably can count on support from European and Asian parliamentary members. However, unless it is also able to attract significant support from the Kenya African National Union (KANU)--which contains the country's most prominent African leaders--the new government probably will be short-lived. KADU's decision to form a government was made only after the British governor agreed to make preliminary arrangements for the release from detention of Mau Mau leader Jomo Kenyatta--probably before the end of this year--and indicated a willingness to consider other points.]

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Kenya

[In the constitution of early 1960, British officials and Kenya nationalist leaders agreed that Africans would be given strong minority representation on the executive council in addition to a majority in the local parliament. The new system, which provided for 53 popularly elected members and 12 indirectly elected "national members," was put into effect following colony-wide elections last February. Of the 37 African seats in the 65-member parliament, KANU controls 20 seats and the smaller KADU 15; two seats are held by independents. The remaining 28 seats were allotted to the minority European, Asian, and Arab communities.]


[The constitutional arrangements in effect clearly indicated the early African domination of Kenya and the ending of white settler control over the colony's political life. The European community of some 66,000, in which a small group of large landholders has wielded influence disproportionate to their numbers, has for the most part reluctantly accepted the concept of ultimate African control. The Asian community of some 170,000--composed largely of commercial and small business entrepreneurs--is no longer a significant political force. The 37,000 Arab minority is conservative and will support efforts to form a representative government.]

[The leaders of KANU, president James Gichuru, general secretary Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, and Julius Kiano, are the most influential African nationalists in Kenya, and any government formed without their support would probably be short-lived. Ronald Ngala, the president of KADU, comes from the politically insignificant coastal area and has no important tribal backing. Most other KADU members represent minor tribes, and if in new elections constituencies were drawn strictly according to population, many KADU representatives would have little chance of being elected.]

[The release of Kenyatta and his early return to Kenya politics even in an advisory capacity would be of great significance to the nationalist movement. The Kikuyu tribe, the largest and]

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[most aggressive in Kenya, has in Kenyatta the country's best known nationalist. Under his influence tribal politicians might be stimulated to oust the present non-Kikuyu nationalist leadership. Although moderate nationalist leaders, recognizing Kenyatta's hold on the Africans, profess to follow his leadership, they undoubtedly hope to limit his participation in politics to some lesser role such as the titular head of government.]



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
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